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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are criminal procedure professors who 
teach, study, and write about the Fourth 
Amendment.1  Amici believe this case presents 
fundamental issues about how the Fourth 
Amendment will be interpreted in thousands of cases 
for decades to come.  Amici are of the view that 
search incident to arrest precedent created in a non-
digital world cannot be logically applied to cell 
phones and other mobile electronic devices. 
The lead amicus, Adam M. Gershowitz, is a 
Professor of Law at William & Mary Law School.  He 
has written numerous law review articles analyzing 
courts’ approaches to searching cell phones incident 
to arrest, including: The iPhone Meets the Fourth 
Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27 (2008); Password 
Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone 
from a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
1125 (2011); Texting While Driving Meets the Fourth 
Amendment: Deterring Both Texting and 
Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 
577 (2012); Seizing a Cell Phone Incident to Arrest: 
Data Extraction Devices, Faraday Bags, or 
Aluminum Foil as a Solution to the Warrantless Cell 
Phone Search Problem, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
601 (2013). 
A list of the other Amici who reviewed and join in 
this brief is included in the attached Appendix. 
                                            
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended 
to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.  No person 
other than the amici curiae or their counsel made a monetary 
contribution to its preparation or submission.  The parties have 
consented to the filing of this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should not apply search incident to 
arrest precedent created in a world of typewriters 
and carbon paper to digital devices capable of storing 
a warehouse full of documents, pictures, and GPS 
location data.  Cell phones carry a lesser risk of 
destruction of evidence and a greater risk of 
government intrusion on privacy than the limited 
technologies on which the search incident to arrest 
doctrine is based.  Rather than allowing warrantless 
searches of cell phones incident to arrest, the Court 
should encourage law enforcement officers to place 
cell phones in Faraday envelopes or aluminum foil to 
prevent the remote wiping of data from the phone 
while officers seek a warrant. 
A Faraday envelope is simply an aluminum-lined 
container that isolates its contents from outside 
signals.  Law enforcement agencies can purchase 
Faraday envelopes for only a few dollars.  In the 
alternative, at a cost of only pennies, police can 
prevent remote wiping by simply wrapping cell 
phones in a sheet of aluminum foil purchased from a 
grocery store.  Because police departments would 
only have to equip a small fraction of officers with 
Faraday envelopes or aluminum foil, the cost would 
be minimal. 
Forbidding warrantless cell phone searches, 
while allowing cell phone seizures, incident to arrest 
is preferable to applying the Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332 (2009) “reasonable to believe” formulation 
to cell phones.  Because of the enormous amount of 
data held on cell phones, it would be reasonable for 
police to believe evidence of numerous minor crimes 
might be held on a cell phone.  The Gant formulation 
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would therefore fail to offer meaningful privacy 
protection. 
ARGUMENT 
I. FARADAY BAGS PREVENT REMOTE CELL 
PHONE DATA WIPING, ARE INEXPENSIVE, 
AND ARE ALREADY WIDELY USED BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT. 
The Court should not apply search incident to 
arrest precedent created in a world of typewriters 
and carbon paper to digital devices capable of storing 
a warehouse full of documents, pictures, and GPS 
location data.  The search incident to arrest doctrine 
enunciated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969) and U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) 
would fail to afford sufficient privacy protection to 
private data and would encourage police to 
unnecessarily rummage through, inter alia, reams of 
text messages, emails, internet browsing history, 
photographs, and GPS location datalocation 
information, and myriad other forms of data stored 
in cell phones.  See Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone 
Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 
44 (2008). 
The government interest in preventing 
destruction of evidence is inapplicable to cell phones 
because there is a simple solution that can protect 
private cell phone data while eliminating the risk of 
remote destruction of evidence: The Court should 
adopt a rule in which police officers who conduct a 
lawful arrest are permitted to seize cell phones 
without a warrant, and then protect evidence on the 
phones by placing them in a Faraday envelope or 
wrapping them in aluminum foil while applying for a 
search warrant. 
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Despite its unusual name, a Faraday envelope is 
a very simple and very common item.  A “‘Faraday 
bag’ or ‘Faraday cage’ [is] essentially an aluminum-
foil wrap or some equivalent, which isolates the cell 
phone from the phone network and from Bluetooth 
and wireless Internet signals.”  U.S. v. Flores-Lopez, 
670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal marks 
omitted).  Faraday cages are omnipresent in 
American households.  They are used in microwave 
ovens to keep the microwaves inside the oven and in 
coaxial cables to keep radiowaves from interfering 
with cable transmission.  See id. (citation omitted).  
In laymen’s terms, once a cell phone is placed inside 
of a Faraday bag or envelope, the phone can no 
longer communicate with the outside world and thus 
cannot be remotely wiped by a conspirator. 
Numerous law enforcement agencies already use 
Faraday bags.2  The United States Department of 
                                            
2 See U.S. v. Smith, 715 F.3d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(“Special Agent Jackson [of the FBI office in St. Louis] then 
placed the four cell phones and the laptop in a ‘Faraday’ bag to 
prevent remote access so the phone could not be remotely 
wiped.”); U.S. v. Mayo, No. 2:13-CR-48, 2013 WL 5945802, at 
*11 & n.9 (D. Vt. Nov. 6, 2013) (noting the practice of Vermont 
State Police to place cell phones in Faraday enclosures); Karl 
Dunnagan & Amber Schroader, Dialing for Evidence, 2 LAW 
OFFICER MAGAZINE 46, 49 (Jan./Feb. 2006), available at 
http://www.lawofficer.com/article/technology-and-
communications/ dialing-evidence (explaining, in an article by a 
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputy, that “[t]o remove a 
handset from the network, use a Faraday bag, such as 
Pareben’s Wireless StrongHold bag”); Noah Shactman, Fighting 
Crime with Cellphones’ Clues, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/technology/techspecial3/03c
ops.html?_r=0 (noting that “when Detective Reiber [of the 
Boise, Idaho Police Department] arrives on the scene, he places 
the phone in a ‘Faraday bag,’ a container made of triwoven 
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Justice and other law enforcement agencies have 
made Faraday bag use part of their policies and 
procedures.3  And local law enforcement agencies 
have encouraged their use.4  In addition to police 
                                                                                          
copper, nickel, and silver that keeps the phone from making or 
receiving calls”). 
3 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ELECTRONIC CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION: A GUIDE FOR FIRST 
RESPONDERS 14 (2d ed. 2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/219941.pdf (“First responders should also have radio 
frequency-shielding material such as faraday isolation bags or 
aluminum foil to wrap cell phones . . . . [to] prevent[] the phones 
from receiving a call, text message, or other communications 
signal that may alter the evidence.”); Legal Update Sept. 2013, 
WEEKLY RAP UP (Monroe Cnty. Sherrif’s Office, Stock Island, 
Fla.), Sept. 2013, at 1, https://www.keysso.net/employees/ 
weekly_rap_up/2013/09132013.pdf (“When you seize a phone . . 
. you can ensure that “it cannot send or receive data . . . [by 
using] a ‘faraday’ bag.”); Chenda Ngak, LulzSec Takes on 
Arizona Law Enforcement, CBS NEWS (Aug. 29, 2011, 3:18 PM),  
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lulzsec-takes-on-arizona-law-
enforcement/ (discussing internal Arizona memo instructing 
that “[l]aw enforcement seizing iPhones as potential evidence 
are recommended to protect the phone from wireless signals . . . 
through the use of a faraday bag”). 
4 E.g., Lt. John Bennett, Don’t Forget the Cell Phone, CYBER 
FORENSICS DIV. NEWSLETTER (Armstrong Atl. State Univ. 
Police, Savannah, Ga.), July/Aug. 2013, at 3, 
http://www.armstrong.edu/images/police/cfdnewsletter.pdf 
(“You can disconnect the phone from the network by placing the 
phone in a Faraday device . . . . The phone can [also] be placed 
in a copper mesh bag, wrapped in aluminum foil (3-5 times), or 
simply sealed in a paint can.  Keep a roll of aluminum foil in 
your vehicle for quick and easy access once the device is in 
possession.”); Graham Kuzia, Handling Cell Phones and Their 
Digital Evidence, POLICE (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://www.policemag.com/blog/technology/story/2013/04/cell-
phone-seizures.aspx (noting in article by North Carolina police 
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officers and departments that have specifically 
acknowledged using Faraday bags, other agencies 
have recommended that approach.5  Indeed, at least 
one state has promulgated a regulation encouraging 
the use of Faraday bags by law enforcement.  W. VA. 
CODE ST. R. § 149-7-6.4.6.3.F.1(a) (instructing law 
enforcement officers that “[w]ireless mobile devices 
should be removed from the wireless networks . . . 
[by] removing the battery or placing the cellular 
telephone in a Faraday bag/container or wrap[ping] 
the device in three layers of aluminum foil . . . .”).   
Faraday bags come in a variety of forms ranging 
from moderately priced to very inexpensive.  On the 
higher end, and selling for $58, are bags that are 
equipped with a clear window so that law 
enforcement can manipulate and examine the phone 
while protecting it from remote wiping.6   
                                                                                          
officer that police should place cell phones in a “Faraday bag, 
aluminum foil, or signal-blocking container . . . . [to] prevent a 
third party from connecting to the phone and being able to alter 
what’s on it”). 
5 See, e.g., VA.  DEP’T OF FORENSIC SCIS., EVIDENCE HANDLING & 
LAB. CAPABILITIES GUIDE III-6 (Sept. 2012), http://www.dfs. 
virginia.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/EvidenceGuide.pdf 
(recommending that cell phones be placed into a “shielded bag” 
such as the Faraday bag manufactured by Paraben 
Corporation); BUREAU OF FORENSIC SERVS., CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PHYSICAL EVIDENCE BULLETIN: DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
COLLECTION—MOBILE DEVICES 3 (Dec. 2011), http://oag.ca.gov/ 
sites/all/files/pdfs/cci/reference/peb_18.pdf (recommending that 
mobile phones be placed “in a Faraday bag or similar material 
(e.g. arson cans, aluminum foil wraps, etc.)”). 
6 See, e.g., Black Hole Faraday Bag—RF Signal Isolation for 
Forensics, Standard Window Size, AMAZON, 
http://www.amazon.com/Black-Hole-Faraday-Bag-isolation/dp/ 
7 
 
 
Police can purchase much cheaper Faraday 
envelopes—metallic-lined envelopes that have pre-
printed chain-of-custody labels on the outside—for 
only $6.95 each, or at a lower price if purchased in 
bulk.7  Even these simpler and cheaper Faraday 
envelopes can “dramatically reduce or completely 
eliminate any risk of remotely disturbing a cell 
phone’s internal memory.”  Charles E. MacLean, 
But, Your Honor, A Cell Phone is Not a Cigarette 
Pack: An Immodest Call for a Return to the Chimel 
Justifications for Cell Phone Memory Searches 
Incident to Lawful Arrest, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 41, 54 
(2012). 
If police departments lack the funding for even 
the $6.95 Faraday envelope, they can have officers 
create their own Faraday envelopes for mere pennies 
by using aluminum foil sold in grocery stores.  The 
essential ingredient in any Faraday device is the 
aluminum that blocks any signal from reaching the 
phone.  Police need only a small amount of 
aluminum foil—a tiny fraction of an ordinary roll—to 
wrap the phone, immobilize it, and prevent the 
destruction of evidence.  See Adam M. Gershowitz, 
Seizing a Cell Phone Incident to Arrest: Data 
Extraction Devices, Faraday Bags, or Aluminum Foil 
as a Solution to the Warrantless Cell Phone Search 
                                                                                          
B0091WILY0/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (noting that the bag 
was “designed for law enforcement digital forensics”). 
7 See Paraben’s Single-Use Stronghold Bags, PARABEN, CORP., 
http://www.paraben.com/single-use-stronghold.html (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2014).  The Faraday envelopes are manufac-
tured by a company specializing in computer forensic software.  
See About Paraben, PARABEN, CORP., http://www.paraben.com/ 
about.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
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Problem, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 601, 609 
(2013).  Given that Walmart sells 150 square feet of 
brand-name aluminum foil for less than $6, and 
given that about a foot of aluminum foil is sufficient 
to wrap a cell phone multiple times, the cost for 
police to create a Faraday enclosure using aluminum 
foil is about four cents. 
Faraday bags, Faraday envelopes, or simple 
aluminum foil render the only rationale for the 
search incident to arrest doctrine that could possibly 
apply to cell phones inapplicable by preventing the 
destruction of evidence.8  See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 
763.  Because Faraday devices or aluminum foil work 
effectively and cheaply, this Court should adopt a 
rule allowing only a seizure of the cell phone incident 
to arrest while the police apply for a search warrant. 
II. FORBIDDING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES 
WHILE ALLOWING SEIZURES PROTECTS 
THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS BETWEEN 
THE GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENS. 
A. Use of Faraday Envelopes or Aluminum Foil 
to Preserve Cell Phone Data Would Impose 
No Burden on Law Enforcement. 
1.  There is no practical limitation on law 
enforcement officers’ ability to carry Faraday bags or 
foil to wrap cell phones, and the Court’s precedents 
                                            
8 The other rationale for the search incident to arrest doctrine—
protecting officer safety—is not plausibly implicated in most 
cell phone searches.  Moreover, to the extent a cell phone search 
would be necessary to protect against a danger to officers, the 
warrantless search could be justified under the general 
exigency exception.  See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 
(1967). 
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support allowing warrantless cell phone seizures to 
preserve evidence.   
First, from a financial standpoint, Faraday 
devices are very inexpensive.  Top-of-the-line Fara-
day bags that can also be used for forensic evaluation 
cost only $58.   Simpler Faraday envelopes can be 
purchased for only $6.95.  And a sheet of aluminum 
foil costs only pennies.  See supra at pp. 7-8. 
Second, there would be no logistical burden on 
most law enforcement officers.  Having a few small 
Faraday envelopes or a few sheets of aluminum foil 
in a squad car is not a significant burden.  Indeed, a 
square foot of aluminum foil is lightweight and can 
be folded small enough to fit easily into a pocket or 
glove compartment.  Moreover, few law enforcement 
officers would need to carry the Faraday envelope or 
aluminum foil with them.  Even though the DEA, 
FBI, and local police officers working in drug or gang 
units might need immediate access to Faraday 
envelopes or aluminum foil, the average officer on 
the street is unlikely to encounter a situation in 
which it is essential to immediately preserve cell 
phone data.9 Thus, the Faraday envelopes and 
                                            
9 A sizeable number of cell phone searches are conducted by a 
relatively small number of specialized law enforcement 
agencies.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(joint operation involving DEA); U.S. v. Stephens, No. 13-
200004, 2013 WL 5409907 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 25, 2013) 
(Organized Crime Unit of local police department); U.S. v. 
Saldago, No. 1:09-CR-454, 2010 WL 3062440 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 
2010) (DEA agents); U.S. v. LaSalle, No. 07-00032, 2007 WL 
1390820 (D. Haw. May 9, 2007) (DEA agent); U.S.  v. Brookes, 
No. CRIM2004-0154, 2005 WL 1940124 (D. V.I. June 16, 2005) 
(DEA agents); U.S. v. Cote, No. 03CR271, 2005 WL 1323343 
(N.D. Ill. May 26, 2005) (FBI agents); U.S.  v. Parada, 289 F. 
Supp.2d 1291 (D. Kan. 2003) (DEA agents); Wisconsin v. 
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aluminum foil can be kept at the police station or in 
the officers’ cruiser. 
In its petition for certiorari in U.S. v. Wurie, the 
United States implicitly conceded that warrantless 
cell phone searches incident to arrest are a concern 
only in narcotics trafficking cases.  Under the section 
heading, “The Question Presented Is Recurring And 
Important,” the United States focused exclusively on 
the need for law enforcement officers to preserve 
evidence in complicated drug trafficking conspira-
cies.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *24-25, 
U.S. v. Wurie, No. 13-212 (Aug. 15, 2013), 2013 WL 
4404658. 
When specialized officers—such as DEA or FBI 
agents—conduct planned operations to interrupt a 
drug trafficking conspiracy, it makes sense that they 
carry Faraday envelopes or aluminum foil in their 
police cruisers so that they can prevent remote 
wiping by conspirators.  
Most ordinary police officers on the street are not 
foiling complicated drug-trafficking operations.  
Ordinary police officers doing routine police work can 
bring cell phones to the police station where the 
phones can be placed in a Faraday envelopes or 
aluminum foil with no logistical difficulty.   
Indeed, numerous cell phone search cases 
decided over the last five years demonstrate that it is 
already very common for police officers to bring cell 
phones to the station prior to searching them.  See, 
e.g., U.S. v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that phone was not searched until ten to 
                                                                                          
Carroll, 778 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 2010) (drug task force agent).  
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fifteen minutes after being taken to the police 
station).10  Faraday envelopes and aluminum foil can 
thus be stored at the station, and the Seventh 
Circuit’s concern that disallowing warrantless cell 
phone searches would place a “burden on the police 
of having to traipse about with Faraday bags” is 
misplaced.  See Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 810. 
                                            
10 See also U.S. v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009) (seized 
cell phones were brought to Virginia State Police headquarters 
and later turned over to the DEA); U.S. v. Gholston, No. 13-
20187, 2014 WL 279609 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2014) (FBI agent 
seized cell phone and then submitted an application for a 
warrant); U.S. v. Dixon, No. 1-12-CR-205, 2013 WL 4718934 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 2013) (ATF agent searched phone at office); 
U.S. v. Nyuon, No. CR.12-40017-01, 2013 WL 943635  (D.S.D. 
Mar. 11, 2013) (drug task force officer searched cell phone at 
station); U.S. v. Dimarco, No. 12CR205, 2013 WL 444764 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2013) (search of cell phone at station six hours 
after arrest); U.S. v. Wall, No. 08-60016, 2008 WL 5381412 
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (DEA agents searched cell phone at 
station); U.S. v. Rocha, No. 06-40057-01, 2008 WL 4498950 (D. 
Kan. Oct. 2, 2008) (search by DEA task force agent at station); 
U.S. v. James, No. 1:06CR134, 2008 WL 1925032 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 
29, 2008) (search “several days after the cell phone was seized” 
under the automobile exception); U.S. v. Park, No. CR05-375, 
2007 WL 1521573 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (phones were taken 
to police station and “placed into envelopes for safe keeping”); 
California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011) (search of cell 
phone 90 minutes after arrestee brought to police station); 
Connecticut v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071 (Conn. 2010) (search of cell 
phone “[l]ater that night” at the police station); Ohio v. Smith, 
920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009) (explaining that search of cell 
phone likely occurred at police station); Gracie v. Alabama, 92 
So.3d 806 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (search of cell phone at 
station); Oregon v. Nix, 237 P.3d 842 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (cell 
phone transported to police station so that it could be analyzed 
by an agent specially trained in cell phones). 
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Finally, if an officer is not near the police station, 
she can request backup from another police officer 
who has a Faraday envelope or aluminum foil in his 
patrol car.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Curry, No. 07-100, 2008 
WL 219966, at *2-3 (D. Me. Jan. 23, 2008) 
(explaining how DEA agent seized cell phones until 
another officer brought an evidence storage bag to 
the scene). 
In sum, even though it might be wise for 
specialized groups of law enforcement agents—such 
as DEA and FBI agents—to be equipped with 
Faraday envelopes or aluminum foil, the vast 
majority of police officers would not have to carry 
either item.  The cost and logistical difficulty of 
Faraday envelopes or aluminum foil is therefore 
minimal. 
2.  There is ample precedent to support a rule 
that police can seize cell phones and place them in 
Faraday envelopes, but not conduct searches of the 
devices without a warrant.  In at least three 
contexts—seizure of individuals, seizure of evidence, 
and searches of automobiles—the Court has 
encouraged police to conduct warrantless seizures in 
order to prevent destruction of evidence so that 
officers can obtain a warrant before searching. 
Seizure of Individuals:  The Court has 
encouraged law enforcement to immobilize 
individuals who might destroy evidence inside of a 
home while the officers apply for a warrant.  In 
Illinois v. MacArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001), the Court 
approved the warrantless seizure of an individual to 
prevent him from entering his home and destroying 
evidence while the police waited for a magistrate to 
issue a warrant.  
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There, police had probable cause to believe 
MacArthur had marijuana in his house, but they 
lacked a warrant to enter.  See id. at 328.  Rather 
than entering and searching without a warrant, the 
officers restricted MacArthur’s movements and 
prevented him from entering the residence 
unsupervised for a period of two hours while they 
applied for a warrant.  See id. at 329.  MacArthur 
moved to suppress the marijuana and related 
contraband on the ground that the police had seized 
him unlawfully.  See id.  The Court rejected 
MacArthur’s challenge to the seizure, concluding 
that the police acted reasonably by taking a far less 
invasive action than a warrantless search.  See also 
Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (despite splitting 
on legality of a search, the majority and minority 
both recognized that it would have been far less 
invasive for police to seal the residence from the 
outside without a warrant, than to search without a 
warrant). 
Seizure of Evidence:  The Court has likewise 
approved of warrantless seizure of tangible items 
while the police procure a warrant to search them.  
In U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), police had 
reasonable suspicion that a traveler who had just 
landed at LaGuardia Airport had drugs in his 
suitcases.  When Place refused to consent to a search 
of the luggage, officers seized the suitcases and took 
them across town to Kennedy Airport where a drug-
sniffing dog alerted that drugs were in at least one of 
the suitcases.  Place moved to suppress on the 
grounds that the police could not seize his luggage 
without a warrant.  Although the Court ultimately 
concluded that the detention of the luggage was too 
lengthy to comply with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
14 
 
 
(1968),11 the Court recognized that it was permissible 
for police to seize the luggage to pursue further 
investigation but not search it without a warrant.  
Once again, the Court recognized that there are 
varying levels of intrusiveness and that a seizure of 
items such as luggage is less invasive than 
warrantless searching.  See id. at 705-06.  See also 
U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 n.8 (1977) (finding 
warrantless search of a footlocker unconstitutional, 
and noting that “[a] search of the interior was 
therefore a far greater intrusion into Fourth 
Amendment values than the impoundment of the 
footlocker”). 
Containers in Automobiles:  For a short time, the 
Court required police with probable cause for a 
specific container in an automobile to seize the 
container, but not search it without a warrant.  Even 
though the Court ultimately abandoned this rule, it 
did so because of peculiarities in the automobile 
context that would not be present with respect to cell 
phones. 
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), 
officers had probable cause to believe that a suitcase 
placed in the trunk of a taxi contained marijuana.  
The police thus had probable cause for a container in 
a vehicle, but not the vehicle itself.  The Court 
refused to uphold a warrantless search of the 
suitcase, concluding that the police should have 
seized the suitcase without a warrant but procured a 
search warrant before opening it.  The Court focused 
                                            
11 The duration problem would not be present in the cell phone 
context because the searches would be incident to arrest, rather 
than under the more limited Terry doctrine at issue in Place. 
15 
 
 
on the privacy associated with luggage and explained 
that “luggage is a common repository for one’s 
personal effects, and therefore is inevitably 
associated with the expectation of privacy.”  Id. at 
762. 
The Court ultimately overruled Sanders in 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) for two 
reasons.  First, requiring containers to be seized but 
not searched without a warrant was too confusing for 
police who had to make quick decisions in the 
automobile context.  See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 576.  
The rule in Sanders—that police had to obtain a 
warrant when they had probable cause solely for a 
container that happened to be in a vehicle—caused 
confusion given that the automobile exception allows 
police to search anything in a vehicle when they have 
probable cause for the vehicle itself.  See U.S. v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1981).  Second, this confusion 
came with negligible benefit because, as the Court 
recognized in Sanders and reiterated in Acevedo, 
“Since the police . . . have probable cause to seize the 
property, we can assume that a warrant will be 
routinely forthcoming. . . .”  Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575 
(quoting Sanders, 442 U.S. at 70).  In short, the rule 
that police had to seize, but not search a container in 
a vehicle, was difficult to apply with respect to 
automobiles and added little privacy protection.12 
                                            
12 Notably, the Acevedo Court did not disturb the rule that 
outside of the automobile context police could seize a container 
but would not be permitted to search it without a warrant.  See 
Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What 
the Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the 
Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1441 
(2010). 
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Neither of these problems would be present in 
the cell phone context.  First, a rule that police can 
seize a cell phone incident to arrest but not search 
the phone without a warrant is perfectly clear.  
Following a lawful arrest, officers will know that 
they may seize a cell phone and place it in a Faraday 
envelope, but that they cannot search it without a 
warrant.  There is no room for ambiguity. 
Second, unlike in Sanders, a bright-line rule 
allowing warrantless seizures—but not searches—of 
cell phones incident to arrest would be very 
protective of privacy.  When police seize a cell phone 
following an arrest, a warrant will not “be routinely 
forthcoming.”  Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575 (quoting 
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 70).  Even though there may be 
probable cause for an arrest, that would not usually 
mean there would be probable cause to believe an 
arrestee’s cell phone contains evidence of a crime.  
Additionally, even if there were probable cause that 
some application on the phone might contain 
evidence, a magistrate could conclude that there is 
only probable cause for particular applications on the 
phone—for instance, the text messages—and 
therefore authorize a search only of that application.  
See Gershowitz, Seizing a Cell Phone Incident to 
Arrest, supra, at 611 (noting that magistrates are 
free to issue warrants that limit which applications 
and functions police can search).  Requiring police to 
procure a warrant will therefore limit the search to 
locations on the phone where evidence is likely to be, 
rather than allowing general rummaging through 
text messages, email, photos, internet browsing 
history, and other private data that also happens to 
be on the phone. 
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B. The Court Should Not Apply Arizona v. 
Gant’s “Reasonable To Believe” Stand-ard To 
Cell Phones. 
This Court should reject the conclusion of a few 
lower courts and scholars that the Arizona v. Gant, 
556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009), “reasonable to believe” 
formulation should be applied to cell phone searches 
incident to arrest because it would allow widespread 
warrantless searches following arrests for minor 
offenses.  The Gant standard would not impose a 
meaningful limitation on law enforcement because it 
could be reasonable for police to believe evidence of 
numerous minor offenses might be found on the 
phone. 
In Gant, the Court narrowed New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454 (1981) by permitting searches of 
vehicles incident to arrest only when the arrestee is 
unsecured or when it is “reasonable to believe 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be 
found in the vehicle.”  Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (quoting 
U.S. v. Thornton, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
In narrowing the search incident to arrest 
doctrine, the Gant Court recognized the need to 
prevent wide-ranging searches following arrests for 
minor offenses.  The Court explained that there was 
a widespread privacy risk in allowing container 
searches: 
[S]earches [under the old rule in Belton] 
authorize police officers to search not just the 
passenger compartment but every purse, 
briefcase, or other container within that space.  
A rule that gives police the power to conduct 
such a search whenever an individual is 
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caught committing a traffic offense, when 
there is no basis for believing evidence of the 
offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a 
serious and recurring threat to the privacy of 
countless individuals.  Indeed, the character of 
that threat implicates the central concern 
underlying the Fourth Amendment—the 
concern about giving police officers unbridled 
discretion to rummage at will among a 
person's private effects. 
Id. at 345. 
A few courts and scholars have maintained that 
applying the Gant “reasonable to believe” 
formulation to cell phone searches would protect 
against invasive searches following arrests for minor 
offenses.  See, e.g., U.S. v. McGhee, No. 8:09CR31, 
2009 WL 2424104, at *3 (D. Neb. July 21, 2009); 
Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological 
Change, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 406-07 
(2013).  This is not correct. 
Because of the enormous quantity and wide 
variety of information held in cell phones, it could be 
reasonable for police to believe evidence of many 
minor crimes might be found on cell phones.  
Applying the Gant standard to cell phone searches 
incident to arrest would thus fail to achieve the goal 
of preventing police officers from having “unbridled 
discretion to rummage at will among a person’s 
private effects.”  Gant, 556 U.S. at 345.  
A few low-level offenses are illustrative. 
Drunk Driving:  Driving while intoxicated is one 
of the most common criminal offenses committed in 
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the United States, with nearly 1.5 million arrests 
annually.13  Many cell phones now have applications 
that enable users to pay their bills by using their 
phones.14  One application—Google Wallet—is now 
accepted as a method of payment in “hundreds of 
thousands of merchant locations in the United 
States.”15  
Because Google Wallet and other cell phone 
applications can hold a receipt documenting the 
location where alcohol was consumed, the time a bar 
tab was paid, and the specific alcoholic drinks 
purchased, it is “reasonable to believe” evidence of 
the crime of drunk driving might be found on the 
phone.  
Additionally, given the frequency with which 
people photograph themselves in social situations, it 
could also be reasonable for police to believe 
photographic evidence of a night of drinking might 
be found in the photo library of a cell phone.  The 
Gant formulation would thus permit searches 
incident to arrest of photo galleries and any 
applications that my contain photos, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, and Instagram following a drunk driving 
arrest. 
                                            
13 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, TABLE 29: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ARRESTS (2009), 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_29.html. 
14 See Laurie Segall, 5 Pay-By-Phone Apps Tested, CNNMONEY 
(Sept. 24, 2012, 9:31 AM), http://money.cnn.com/gallery/ 
technology/2012/09/24/mobile-payment-apps/index.html. 
15 See Frequently Asked Questions, GOOGLE WALLET, 
http://www.google.com/wallet/faq.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2014).  
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Texting While Driving:  Many jurisdictions 
criminalize texting while driving or other types of 
distracted driving, such as operating a vehicle while 
“[m]anually entering multiple letters or text in the 
device as a means of communicating with another 
person.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-137.4A; see 
Adam M. Gershowitz, Texting While Driving Meets 
the Fourth Amendment: Deterring Both Texting and 
Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 
577 (2012) (summarizing all state statutes).  And 
even though most jurisdictions punish texting while 
driving and other distracted driving with only a 
small fine, minor traffic offenses are arrestable 
offenses in many jurisdictions.  See Janet Koven 
Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. 
Whren and the Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 145, 152 nn.63-64 (1996) (minor traffic 
offenses are arrestable offenses in many 
jurisdictions).  As such, police in many states are 
authorized to conduct a search incident to arrest 
following an arrest for texting while driving.  See 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 
(2001).    
If an officer arrests an individual for texting 
while driving, it would obviously be reasonable for 
the officer to believe evidence of the texting might be 
found on the driver’s cell phone.  But the officer 
would not be limited to reviewing text messages.  In 
states that forbid “manually entering multiple letters 
or text in the device as a means of communicating” 
while driving, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-137.4A, 
it would be reasonable for the officer to search, at 
minimum, any text messages, email messages, 
internet browsing history, Facebook accounts, or 
other social media applications on the phone for 
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evidence that the phone was in use while driving.  
Under the Gant rationale, officers would therefore be 
justified in conducting wide-ranging searches of cell 
phones for low-level traffic offenses that carry only a 
small fine.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 
13B (punishing texting while driving with a $100 
fine); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.3 ($100 fine); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-137.4A ($100 fine); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 31-22-30 ($85 fine); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-
199 (fine of no more than $50); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
346.89 (up to $75 fine). 
Low Level Drug Possession: The Gant 
formulation could also permit police to search cell 
phones incident to arrest following arrests for 
possession of a small amounts of drugs, such as 
marijuana.   
Drug purchases are often coordinated by text 
message.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Aguirre, 664 F.3d 606, 
615 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting testimony of FBI agent 
that cell phones record evidence of the “buying and 
selling of drugs”); U.S. v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 254 
n.2 (5th Cir. 2007) (describing incriminating text 
messages in search incident to arrest of cell phone).  
Because law enforcement is aware that texting is a 
way to conduct drug transactions, officers are trained 
to search cell phones in drug arrests.  See U.S. v. 
Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *4 
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (quoting testimony of drug 
enforcement agent that “it is his practice to search 
cell phones for text messages primarily because 
DEA’s policy allows for it and because it is common 
to find text messages that further the investigation”). 
An officer who arrests a suspect for possession of 
a small amount of marijuana may reasonably believe 
22 
 
 
the purchase was coordinated by text message or 
other social media communication, thus authorizing 
a search of the phone under the Gant formulation.  
An arrest for a small amount of marijuana could 
therefore permit a wide-ranging search of the 
phone’s text messages, emails, or Facebook 
messages.  
Because police conduct thousands of arrests for 
minor narcotics possession each year,16 the Gant 
formulation would authorize police to search cell 
phones incident to arrest following an enormous 
number of low-level drug possession arrests. 
Any offense in which location data proves guilt: 
Perhaps most significantly, applying the Gant 
standard to cell phone searches incident to arrest 
would authorize police to search cell phones incident 
to arrest for any crime where a suspect’s location 
could help to prove his guilt.    
  Cell phones contain an enormous amount of 
location data that can link an individual to minor 
criminal activity.  Some cell phones contain a history 
function that documents every location where the 
phone has been for multiple weeks.   
On iPhones with new operating systems, a police 
officer simply has to tap the “Settings” icon, then 
“Privacy,” followed by “Location Services,” then 
“System Services,” and finally “Frequent Locations.”  
The iPhone will then show the addresses where the 
phone has been over the last few weeks.  And if the 
                                            
16 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERV., ADULT 
ARRESTS: 2003-2012, http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ 
ojsa/arrests/Allcounties.pdf (noting 62,115 to 83,758 misdemea-
nor drug arrests annually in New York City alone). 
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officer taps on a particular address, the iPhone will 
specify the exact dates and times when the phone 
was present at that location.  See Dwight Silverman, 
Your iPhone Knows Where You’ve Been, Puts It on a 
Map, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 31, 2013, 
http://blog.chron.com/techblog/2013/10/your-iphone-
knows-where-youve-been-puts-it-on-a-map/. 
Older phones and less sophisticated models also 
contain functions or applications that include 
location data.  The map function on many cell phones 
can provide law enforcement with the specific 
addresses where an individual has recently traveled.  
The Foursquare check-in application can 
automatically record when a phone has been near a 
specific business.17   
In light of the vast location data stored on cell 
phones, it is reasonable for law enforcement to 
believe evidence of many minor crimes might be 
found on the phone.  For example, following a 
prostitution arrest, officers might reasonably believe 
the cell phone could link the arrestee to an 
incriminating address.  In an arrest for petty theft, 
the phone might show that the arrestee was at the 
store when the theft occurred.  In an arrest for public 
intoxication or underage drinking, the phone might 
prove presence at a bar or on a public street.  
In all of these examples—driving while 
intoxicated, texting while driving, minor drug 
possession, prostitution, petty theft, public 
intoxication, and underage drinking—the phones 
                                            
17 See MG Siegler, Check-in on Foursquare Without Taking 
Your Phone Out of Your Pocket, TECHCRUNCH, Aug. 2, 2010, 
http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/02/future-checkin/. 
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might contain evidence that links individuals to 
criminal activity.  The problem is not this 
incriminating evidence.  The problem is the reams of 
unrelated private information—voicemail and text 
messages from spouses or lovers, health records, 
embarrassing photographs, business documents, and 
future travel plans—that law enforcement officers 
will be able to review after arresting an individual 
for a minor crime.  See Adam M. Gershowitz, The 
iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 27, 41-44 (2008) (detailing the sensitive and 
embarrassing information an officer can come across 
during a search incident to arrest of a cell phone). 
Moreover, allowing searches of cell phones under 
the Gant formulation would invite abuse.  It is not 
far-fetched to imagine a police officer, after pulling 
someone over and arresting him for texting while 
driving, to suspect that he may have committed 
other crimes based on his look, the location, or even 
the time of day.  The officer could then arrest the 
suspect for texting while driving and rummage 
through any text messaging application looking for 
evidence of other crimes the officer has a hunch the 
driver may have committed. 
As technology advances, the list of minor offenses 
that could give rise to an invasive cell phone search 
under the Gant formulation will almost certainly 
grow.  As time and technology move forward, the 
Gant formulation will therefore provide less and less 
protection against general police rummaging of cell 
phones.  Accordingly, the Court should reject the 
Gant formulation in specifying the scope of a search 
incident to arrest of cell phones. 
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* * * 
A bright-line rule permitting seizures, but not 
searches, of cell phones incident to arrest would in no 
way injure law enforcement’s ability to preserve 
evidence.  Should law enforcement choose to use a 
Faraday envelope or aluminum foil, that approach 
would be both workable for the police and protective 
of the reams of private data stored on or accessible 
from cell phones.  And as the Court explained in 
Segura, “a seizure affects only possessory interests, 
not privacy interests.  Therefore, the heightened 
protection we accord privacy interests is simply not 
implicated where a seizure of premises, not a search, 
is at issue.”  468 U.S. at 810.  Thus, the rule finds the 
right balance between protecting the government’s 
evidence preservation interest and the citizen’s 
privacy interest. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the judgment below should be 
reversed in Riley and affirmed in Wurie.   
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